In a truly remarkable article for Portal “Kultura”, Assoc. Prof. Ognyan Minchev comes to important and valuable conclusions about the current practical state of liberal democracy and the political aspects therein involved. All these conclusions are true in practice, but the problem is that the root cause of this situation, where the real critique of liberal democracy lies, hasn’t been reached. In this sense, although a brilliant historical-political guide to the main ideas of the last two centuries, the material does not achieve a real defence of liberalism and liberal democracy outside the practical dimensions. Omitting this avoids the most important conclusion – even if we assume that the current state of liberal democracy is undesirable and unforeseen, or even that it is usurped by “evil” forces, this is enshrined in its very doctrine, or in short – “It would always happen that way”.
Beyond the dominant discourse
If practical politics has its theory in political science, political science has its theory expressed in political philosophy. Which in turn can always come down to theology, as all formulations on state supremacy are superficial secularisations of the supremacy of God[1], but this is a lengthy subject. For a debate on political philosophy, as the one on liberal democracy is, to be complete, the problem has to be considered outside of the dominant discourse. According to Foucault, the discourse is “ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them.”[2]. The role of the discourse is the legitimisation of public authority to create temporary truths, to maintain these truths, and determine the power hierarchies between these truths.[3]
In general, the discourse is a collection of socially established narratives that define what can and what cannot be “said” within the boundaries of the dominant discourse. On the other hand, the dominant discourse depends on factors that go beyond language but are determined by certain social attitudes accepted as axioms but mostly depend on the power hierarchies that impose a certain order in which the dominant discourse in question can exist. Two derived definitions that explain it more precisely than the researchers of Foucault would be “systems of thoughts comprised of ideas, attitudes, paths, beliefs and practices which systematically build the subjects and worlds they speak of”[4] as well as the more laconic “every practice through which people give meaning to reality”[5].
Going beyond the dominant liberal discourse is not an easy task for two main reasons. Firstly because of its duration, as it does not originate from the victory of the West as a model over the communist bloc, nor the Second World War, but from the so-called “Enlightenment” and the French revolution that followed. In addition to the time parameter, we also have comprehensiveness – in all areas of human activity – from philosophy to entertainment and popular culture.
In short, we could not defend or attack liberal democracy with arguments that are entirely the result of liberalism. For this to be done, it is necessary to go beyond the dominant discourse of liberal democracy and to “say what is not acceptable to be said” within it.
The Boundaries of the Political
In order to understand the reasons for the underlying defect of liberal democracy, it is necessary to establish several basic axioms: for the incompatibility of liberalism and democracy, for the Conflict as a basis of political existence, and the Sovereign as determinative for the Exception.
In the first place, this is the eternal incompatibility between “liberal” and “democracy”. Simply defined, liberalism in itself is a pedestal of individual rights, and democracy is the contrary – the majority determining the norms even on what and which these rights are. Noting this paradox is not something new or radical, although its mention by Ivan Krastev in an interview with DW a few months ago stirred controversy.[6] In order to avoid this contradiction, liberalism resorts to “normativism” – the creation of legitimacy through legalism. Normativism is the genesis of bureaucratism and technocracy and even though on the surface it resolves the incompatibility between liberalism and democracy, in fact, the paradoxical nature of the combination of the two remains.
This leads us to the second postulate – the political is determined by the division between friend and foe.[7] It is this division that is “castrated” by liberal democracy, which sets boundaries of the possible political debate by imposing its dominant discourse. Liberal normativism is not just a rival to a political system, it aims to eliminate the political system entirely by destroying the fundamental for politics (and identity in every sense) distinction between friend and foe. Removing such a distinction does not simply make societies apolitical and/or immersed in pettiness and endless conversations, debates, discussions and compromises without the ability to make decisions. Taking people away from the political through the elimination of conflict and the division between friend and foe makes the (non)participants uncritical consumers without real power in the political process. This division transcends even beyond its purely political nature and is key to identity. The lack of a constructed or inherited identity is an inherent problem of liberal democracy, as without it a social contract protected by the sovereign is impossible.[8]
The paradox leads to another problem – whenever the situation gets out of the normative framework (be it legislation, constitution, or a regulation), liberalism self-destructively implodes. We see it in the pandemic situation – “those who decide on the exception”, i.e. those who actually have the power, i.e. are der Souverän[9], suspend exactly the individual rights provided by liberalism. The key lies precisely in making the decision on the exception. When all prescriptions, plans and legislation are rendered invalid by the circumstances, the power really comes down to making an emergency decision that does not comply with them but only with the inherently determinative political divide between friend and foe. In this sense, the State as a subject of power, irrespective of its representatives, is crucially dependent on its political character. The refusal or inability to make a political decision leads to tragic results, well described by Tocqueville[10] when the French aristocracy was completely passive and self-deceived in its humanistic understanding of the good in man. This also leads us to:
The fundamental eschatological problem
The old anecdote goes that the spread of humanism as an idea is followed mainly by genocides. The problem at the core of most post-Enlightenment doctrines lies at the theological level – at the understanding of the Original sin. Liberalism (and all its derivatives), as well as communism, rely on the idea that man is inherently good, and the only reason for the existence of Evil are deviations, circumstances, or being (which, according to the latter determines consciousness). Taken to its final form, this leads to various kinds of anarchism, irrespective of what suffix is put after it. Which in turn leads to varying degrees of denial of the state entity – from distrust to complete denial. This comes down to Thomas Paine’s famous quote that “society is produced by our wants, and government by wickedness”[11]. Although liberal democracy is not radical (and never has been), its purpose has always been neutralisation and depoliticisation achieved through building mistrust between “citizens” and the “state” hidden behind false declarations of individual rights and liberties. The latter lead to the “left reproach” or practically the same claim of both liberals and socialists for moral and ethical superiority, albeit hollow, if we follow the historical method. This is not at all instinctive or accidental, but doctrinal – the façade of moral superiority is a claim to power over those perceived as immoral.
The next paradox of liberal order is namely that, taking the position of moral superiority, it tries to speak on behalf of “man” or “mankind” – thus not avoiding the politically decisive division of friend-foe, but on the contrary. The logic of the Political turns out to be inevitable. But in this case, the “foe” is dehumanised, deprived of its human nature. The boundaries set by liberal democracy exclude everything outside of it, which renders the claim for universality invalid, and the liberal democracy system itself from a side of a conflict to an impartial arbiter of a quasi-political conflict.
Divide and rule
The “castration” of the Political is carried out by dividing the spheres of human activity – politics, culture, ethics, economics, etc. Particularly interesting in the context is the sphere of economics, which through the depoliticised concept of the post-Enlightenment thought is not only trying to be entirely separated from the Political but to even replace the Political entirely. In fact, empirically proven almost all divisions, as small as they may be in present days, are viewed through economic divisions (right-left), and not through purely political or ideological. The parallel between liberalism and Marxism is inevitable on a theoretical level, as both view people as economic units (individual, consumer) and not as political figures. The difference lies only in the ethical endpoint, used as a façade, behind which the two systems hide – one behind “freedom”, and the other behind “equality”. Replacing politics with economic doctrines is not only successful, but it is also an integral part of the dominant liberal discourse, incorrectly equating economic systems with political ones (capitalism – liberal democracy, communism – authoritarianism), despite the current examples from the Far East, that even today they do not necessarily go hand in hand.
This autonomisation of ethics, morals, religion, economics leads to the present-day results, as well as to the “renunciation of opinion” of the Political. Which, going back to the binary conflict system of friend and foe, renders everything relative. (On that point – later). If liberal democracy has any sad dignity, it is the separation of powers and institutions that are designed to stalk one another and pull themselves back into the cauldron as the Bulgarians do in hell. However, this proves once again that man is born bad and has no power to fight with himself, so he is forced to resort to public bureaucratic constructions.[12]
The replacement of the Political is carried out not only through the economic “debate” but also through humanistic ethics, which very unsuccessfully tries to solve the previously considered eschatological problem through normativism – with rights and the “rule of law“.
Rights or privileges?
The Enlightenment secularisation and subsequent autonomisation that we have already considered, lead to the need to build the rules of the novus ordo seclorum by constituting the framework of the global liberal claim – universal rights, or the better known “natural rights”. Some more ironic individuals would ask why, since they are “natural”, they increase every year. Although humorous, such a comment would be true. Natural rights, derived as a concept from the God-given rights, unlike legal positivism, have been abandoned.
Liberal democracy and the defined (and increasing!) human rights are nothing more than privileges we have decided to confer to ourselves under the current social contract. The problem can again be brought down to a theological one. Virtually all fundamental rights (life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness) can be traced back to Sinai.
The idea of natural rights in the concept of natural law precedes with at least five centuries the so-called Enlightenment and liberalism – for example, from the time of Tomas Aquinas[13]. Liberal normativism however removes the foundation on which the natural law of Aquinas is built, through the secularisation of the state and, in practice, the elimination of one of the three basic paradigms (Faith, Reason, Will). For the rights to be natural, they must be derived from a subject of the absolute essence (according to Ibn Sina). The great sin of liberalism is precisely the depersonification of Truth and its transformation into an abstraction, which by definition is relative and “a matter of perspective”. The Christian fundament is replaced by metaphysical ethics and imaginary “humanism”. Removing the axiomatic value of Truth creates not only a theological and philosophical problem but also a purely practical one – the rights can be whatever those who have concluded the specific social contract have decided. Which makes them privileges that are not universal or “to all men” at all, but a sheet of paper that can be rewritten, supplemented, edited, and shortened at will. Because “natural law” does not mean “the laws of nature” – does the drowning person have the right to life? Without the Christian basis, everything remains relative.
In this sense, today’s perversion of the “rule of law” as an instrument for dehumanising and repressing dissenters is not a “bug in the system” of liberalism. Cancel culture is not something extraordinary, but a natural development of liberal democracy – only a legitimisation of a specific status quo, the preservation of which is in the interest of those who impose or benefit from the dominant discourse. Without absolute authority, there are no absolute and irrevocable rights, only the greatest experiment in creating legitimacy through legalism.[14] Although this is a fundamental defect per se, it also reveals a far bigger problem.
Nihilism, relativism and the Last man
Nietzsche is inevitable in any exercise on post-Enlightenment thought, although his texts are mythopoetic rather than philosophical. His concept of the Übermensch and the Last man is especially important in the context of liberal relativism.
In addition to the paradigms and forces of faith and reason, according to Schopenhauer, the will is essential too, but not just the will itself, the will to live – a person to continue to be because he cannot imagine himself outside of life. “The Curse of Man” – the knowledge of one’s own mortality, of limited time, leads to “logical suicide“, which is well described by Camus (especially in “The Stranger”). According to Schopenhauer, this is avoided (as a continuation to Blaise Pascal) by creating “notions” or constant distractions.
Nietzsche takes and develops the idea of the will from Schopenhauer, derives the will not for life, but for power – the desire to dominate your peers. Power is a hierarchy of wills, avoiding Camus’s “logical suicide” through obedience. The hierarchical arrangement of the wills creates the very identity of man. According to Foucault, where there are two wills, there is already subordination of one will to the other. All human relations can be brought down to a struggle of wills for power. By power, Nietzsche means not only that in the political sense but anything that allows domination over one’s peers.
The Übermensch is not God but aspiration – a direct development of Nietzsche’s concepts of both the will to power and the “Death of God”. The Übermensch is at the top of the hierarchy of wills to power – without any power over himself, including that of God. The Übermensch is the one who has no power over himself but realises his own power. God is dead, killed by man, that is, faith in God can no longer “produce” values, morals, and meaning in life. The Übermensch is the “medicine” that man must strive for because the danger of sinking into nihilism is eternal – the creator of new values and aspirations that give meaning to existence and the ultimate realisation of the will to power.
Its antithesis is “The Last Man” – a product of the egalitarian modern world – a nihilistic, apathetic society that has lost its desire for development, its ability to “dream”, to strive for its will to power – the very reason for existence. Paradoxically, Nietzsche gives rise to almost all ideologies that achieve exactly what he warns about – the domination of the “last man”.
The intrinsic tendency of Enlightenment philosophy (for “universal freedom” in contrast to ancient liberalism, which strives for human perfection) leads to two types of nihilism [15]. The brutal nihilism of the Nazi and Bolshevik regimes, which sought to destroy all traditions, history, ethics, and moral standards and replace them with a force in which nature and humanity were subdued and subjugated. [16] The second type – “gentle“ nihilism, expressed in Western liberal democracies, is a type of aimlessness and hedonistic “permissive egalitarianism” that, according to him, penetrates the fabric of modern society. [17] [18]
The inevitable entropy
Going back to the lack of identity (after rejecting the friend-foe definition), liberal democracy is always susceptible to usurpation and losing in the face of an enemy (that cannot be even recognised as such) with a well-established identity and clear aims. Even if we ignore all that has been said so far and assume that the current state of liberal democracy is something unusual or usurped, and cultural Marxism is something more than a symptom, it then follows to answer ourselves – how did this come about?
Entropy, in its simplest form, is a measure of chaos in a system. Derived from the second law of thermodynamics, the theory is applicable in almost every scientific system, including the information theory, sociology, and political systems. Every system, if left unattended, naturally strives to increase entropy (chaos) and dissipate working energy. In simple words – without constant interference, everything leads to chaos.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, a unipolar political model of the all-conquering liberal democracy was established on a global scale – the End of History per Fukuyama. More than thirty years later, we can safely conclude (just like himself) that the end of history has not occurred at all. And that Huntington was far closer to the truth in “The Clash of Civilizations” and will only get closer. Kant’s universalist dream of a “world res publica” did not come true.
And yet, what happened in those thirty years? The lack of poles, significant conflict, and opposition did not lead to great unification and concentration in a world government, but on the contrary – in fragmentation and increase of entropy, chaos, simply because “everyone was left on their one” and the great opposition became a number of smaller conflicts that could in no way replace the energy exchange needed to keep entropy levels low. In a unipolar world, global politics matters only to the pole, and for everyone else, politics is local.
The utopian “eternal peace” is a state of maximum entropy – the “thermal death of the Universe”. To quote Hegel: ” War is not to be regarded as an absolute evil… just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone ‘perpetual’, peace.” [19]
We can conclude that the lack of conflict(s), not only in the military sense, leads to energy dissipation and, accordingly – to an increase in entropy.
Liberal democracy as the last resort of ideological provincialism
The practical application of such an indirect argument is minimal and almost as directly beneficial to civilisation as the exploration of Mars. Although remote and perhaps too theoretical, it is important, if not for reaching the Truth, then at least for taking the debate beyond the ideological provincialism so typical of Bulgarian intellectual life of repeating dubious theorems as axioms. And this is the only way to do it, because, in order to argue on the liberal consensus, it is necessary to go beyond the discourse imposed by it and say the already mentioned “things that should not be said”.
Of course, the conversation would be meaningless if there was no single starting point from which the participants to begin. Once again the argument flies over philosophy and lands on theological questions, without an agreement on which the debate would be unequal. Is man born good or damaged by original sin? Is history cyclical or linear? Is death the end or the beginning? Are Morality, Truth, and Beauty relative?
Without an agreement on these issues, the parties to the argument will look like batteries firing volleys in all other directions, but not against each other. Without clarifying these issues, the dominant discourse is wrong, so no meaningful conclusions can be drawn from its premises.
One is free to choose, but what he chooses is not without meaning. And for the knights of “natural rights”, every choice is equally good.
Let us not forget that the most horrific crimes were committed in the name of “humanism“, the deadliest wars were fought “for peace“, the greatest inequalities for “equality” and the most severe repressions behind the idea of ”freedom“. And not by impostors, but by true believers.
